Ransomware / data theft and extortionHighTLP:CLEAR

Curious Worm extortion

Curious Worm Extortion Group Hits Healthcare Through Fake IT Helpdesk Teams Calls and HopToDesk

Published
16 November 2026
Added
17 November 2026, 06:54 UK
Last updated
17 November 2026

5 to block now6 to hunt

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Summary

PacketWatch reported on 16 November 2026 on The Curious Worm, a new data-extortion group that has listed ten victims ... No encryptor has been seen; the group steals data and threatens to publish it.

Do now

  1. Block the 5 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Block 45.61.182.162 and the four published hashes, and search EDR, proxy….

Indicators 11

ValueTypeActionCopy
45[.]61[.]182[.]162IPv4block
0749da962da7976b8…6bd21759ceSHA256block
2801508ad8c230610…bb175b6816SHA256block
ab03d2966db57af78…508a74fbdbSHA256block
e3ffbe69c618483a9…e6456b07fcSHA256block
149[.]137[.]140[.]232IPv4alert
104[.]153[.]238[.]47IPv4alert
51[.]158[.]148[.]82IPv4alert
208[.]87[.]243[.]197IPv4alert
23[.]95[.]73[.]236IPv4alert
185[.]126[.]237[.]11IPv4alert

Sources packetwatch.com · databreaches.net

More detail
Note PacketWatch is the single source for the indicators and says a fuller report will follow; DataBreaches.net and MedRisk reported the leak site and its healthcare victims from 12 November. 149[.]137[.]140[.]232 and 104[.]153[.]238[.]47 are Backblaze storage addresses and 51[.]158[.]148[.]82, 208[.]87[.]243[.]197, 23[.]95[.]73[.]236 and 185[.]126[.]237[.]11 are HideMyIP VPN exits; all six are shared and alert only. The HopToDesk relay hosts PacketWatch lists are the vendor's own infrastructure and are not listed; hunt for unexpected HopToDesk installs instead.

What to do

  1. Block 45[.]61[.]182[.]162 and the four published hashes, and search EDR, proxy and firewall logs from 1 November 2026 for all seven addresses.
  2. Restrict external Microsoft Teams chats and calls to approved domains, and tell staff and the service desk that IT will never ask them to install remote-support tools during an unsolicited call.
  3. Block or alert on installs of HopToDesk, AnyDesk and GetScreen where they are not approved, and on deno.exe running JavaScript from %APPDATA%\Roaming or listening on TCP 10091.
  4. Hunt for renamed rclone (sync.exe) or S3Browser (CSBrowser) and for large uploads to Backblaze B2, and alert on DCSync (directory replication requests) from hosts that are not domain controllers.

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Not stated
Sectors
Healthcare, Manufacturing, Legal

Background

PacketWatch reported on 16 November 2026 on The Curious Worm, a new data-extortion group that has listed ten victims on its leak site since early November, eight of them healthcare organisations and the others in chemical manufacturing and legal services. No encryptor has been seen; the group steals data and threatens to publish it. Operators call staff on Microsoft Teams posing as the IT helpdesk and talk them into installing the HopToDesk remote-support tool. In one case they ran DCSync and a pass-the-hash attack on a global administrator account about an hour after first access, then took over further accounts. For persistence they install a Deno-based JavaScript RAT (tracked by CrowdStrike as Dindoor) downloaded from 45[.]61[.]182[.]162, saved under %APPDATA%\Roaming with a host-derived random name, listening on port 10091 and set to run from the HKCU Run key, and later add AnyDesk and GetScreen. They move laterally over RDP, WMI, SMB and WinRM, pull backups with S3Browser renamed to CSBrowser and push data to Backblaze with rclone renamed to sync.exe, about 12 hours from first access to exfiltration. The payload server and four file hashes are on the block list.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK10

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