Operation ShadowCloud
Operation ShadowCloud: GitDoor and GraphDoor Backdoors Hide Command Traffic in GitHub, SharePoint and Ably to Spy on Governments in Asia and Africa
- Published
- 17 November 2026
- Added
- 17 November 2026, 08:56 UK
- Last updated
- 17 November 2026
37 to block now14 to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Kaspersky GReAT published a two-part report on 17 November 2026 on Operation ShadowCloud, an espionage campaign activ... The loaders decrypt a config.ini payload into one of two new backdoors.
Do now
- Block the 37 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Block the proxy and MeshCentral C2 addresses and the twnic.top and….
Indicators 51
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
27[.]102[.]66[.]162 | IPv4 | block | |
104[.]194[.]154[.]28 | IPv4 | block | |
216[.]73[.]158[.]72 | IPv4 | block | |
122[.]147[.]252[.]16 | IPv4 | block | |
103[.]106[.]230[.]33 | IPv4 | block | |
123[.]58[.]205[.]105 | IPv4 | block | |
223[.]165[.]4[.]203 | IPv4 | block | |
172[.]86[.]66[.]19 | IPv4 | block | |
103[.]214[.]68[.]20 | IPv4 | block | |
216[.]146[.]25[.]173 | IPv4 | block | |
103[.]137[.]63[.]39 | IPv4 | block | |
103[.]227[.]224[.]189 | IPv4 | block | |
104[.]194[.]152[.]173 | IPv4 | block | |
66[.]42[.]52[.]137 | IPv4 | block | |
153[.]75[.]94[.]148 | IPv4 | block | |
45[.]59[.]124[.]164 | IPv4 | block | |
104[.]194[.]153[.]161 | IPv4 | block | |
153[.]75[.]95[.]27 | IPv4 | block | |
216[.]73[.]158[.]117 | IPv4 | block | |
154[.]205[.]154[.]209 | IPv4 | block | |
43[.]134[.]62[.]111 | IPv4 | block | |
38[.]54[.]17[.]113 | IPv4 | block | |
twnic[.]top | Domain | block | |
ms[.]twnic[.]top | Domain | block | |
ekmt[.]tw | Domain | block | |
14ec33ea808e69787…5e434c2952 | MD5 | block | |
552f0a9cc5fc37557…9be05e8035 | MD5 | block | |
32151547d912488ac…31057170a3 | MD5 | block | |
e9d4081fac4a5111e…333d490439 | MD5 | block | |
e63ec733393e4e7e3…ff918003a3 | MD5 | block | |
3896d44bc6d517291…3f70543a31 | MD5 | block | |
b930fb3ab14fe45b3…cfa6e0a763 | MD5 | block | |
6a54f8008ee659b69…5dba2b2cc1 | MD5 | block | |
91bee19d31d32346c…ebb4308606 | MD5 | block | |
9a5e0ab7466594dcf…c413db7b81 | MD5 | block | |
733f8002aa9531b25…014d15cc1f | MD5 | block | |
45b3aa39bc3352865…1cd946b2df | MD5 | block | |
38[.]52[.]17[.]113 | IPv4 | alert | |
buildersemp[.]sha…oint[.]com | Domain | alert | |
cskautogo[.]sharepoint[.]com | Domain | alert | |
74b025084026d8d9a…bf995d835b | MD5 | alert | |
hxxps://github[.]…CharnleyaW | URL | alert | |
hxxps://github[.]…nDFournier | URL | alert | |
hxxps://github[.]com/JeneLeo | URL | alert | |
hxxps://github[.]…oraKlanimU | URL | alert | |
hxxps://github[.]…aJazzmynwC | URL | alert | |
hxxps://github[.]…aineSuvitC | URL | alert | |
hxxps://github[.]…ocelynxccZ | URL | alert | |
hxxps://github[.]…nsadolph1n | URL | alert | |
hxxps://github[.]…eserinYtas | URL | alert | |
C:\ProgramData\Intel_Log | Other | alert |
Sources Kaspersky · Kaspersky (2)
More detail
What to do
- Block the proxy and MeshCentral C2 addresses and the twnic[.]top and ekmt[.]tw domains, then search firewall, proxy and DNS logs from March 2026 for any connection to them.
- Hunt for unexpected MeshCentral (MeshAgent) installs and for Sandboxie start.exe, javaw.exe, pythonw.exe or zoomit.exe running from %ProgramData%, System32 subfolders or Program Files\PDF24 next to SbieDll.dll, jli.dll, python39.dll, WINMM.dll or libcef.dll and a config.ini file.
- Look for non-browser, non-developer processes calling api.github.com, graph.microsoft.com, rest.ably.io or upload.gofile.io, and for a C:\ProgramData\Intel_Log\<GUID> folder or named pipes in the form \\.\pipe\p<PID>.
- Review Entra ID sign-ins and app registrations for access to the SharePoint sites buildersemp[.]sharepoint[.]com and cskautogo[.]sharepoint[.]com.
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- W, Asia, Africa
- Sectors
- Government
Background
Kaspersky GReAT published a two-part report on 17 November 2026 on Operation ShadowCloud, an espionage campaign active since early 2026 against mainly government organisations in Asia and Africa. The intruders used a MeshCentral agent, hard-coded to wss://27[.]102[.]66[.]162:443/agent.ashx and apparently placed through an earlier infection, to drop legitimate executables (Sandboxie Start, javaw, pythonw, ZoomIt) that side-load malicious loaders named SbieDll.dll, jli.dll, python39.dll, WINMM.dll and libcef.dll. The loaders decrypt a config.ini payload into one of two new backdoors. GitDoor uses GitHub issues, labels and repository files under throwaway accounts as its command channel and also talks to the Ably messaging service; GraphDoor authenticates to login.microsoftonline.com and uses Microsoft Graph and attacker SharePoint sites (buildersemp[.]sharepoint[.]com, cskautogo[.]sharepoint[.]com) for commands, then pulls plug-ins for keylogging, process listing, screenshots, file moves and proxying through a modified Erfrp client or Ably channels. Both backdoors inject further shellcode in memory, and files are exfiltrated to upload.gofile.io. Kaspersky does not attribute the campaign to one group, but found GitDoor staged in the same folders as FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle implants within a day of each other, and proxy servers ms[.]twnic[.]top and ekmt[.]tw were also Cobalt Strike servers seen on GraphDoor victims. Sophos earlier described part of the same activity.