Supply chain / MagecartCriticalTLP:CLEAR

Optimizely script skimmer

Optimizely Project JavaScript Supply-Chain Attack Plants a Crypto Clipper, Card Skimmer and iOS Exploits on Major Websites

Published
16 November 2026
Added
17 November 2026, 04:48 UK
Last updated
17 November 2026

23 to block now13 to hunt2 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Attackers injected a crypto clipper, card skimmer and iOS exploit kit into Optimizely Project JavaScript served to major websites. On 16 November 2026, attackers abused a vulnerability in Optimizely's Experimentation account signup flow to write malicious Project JavaScript into customer….

Do now

  1. Block the 23 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for track.js.

Indicators 36

ValueTypeActionCopy
1688360[.]ccDomainblock
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuDomainblock
eil786npto9u5bq[.]icuDomainblock
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icuDomainblock
q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icuDomainblock
je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icuDomainblock
ios-hack[.]icuDomainblock
p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icuDomainblock
1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icuDomainblock
gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icuDomainblock
webshell[.]lolDomainblock
linkforge[.]ccDomainblock
hxxps://1688360[.…c/track.jsURLblock
hxxps://1688360[.…c/card.phpURLblock
hxxps://1688360[.]cc/hit.phpURLblock
814a963c0da480e24…5badec3a0fSHA256block
f7b84b9a94f749f8c…976a9bad40SHA256block
617df364120adc47f…6254ab02f3SHA256block
hxxps://1688360[.…vas.min.jsURLblock
hxxps://5vobauua3…cu/boot.jsURLblock
hxxps://eil786npt…cu/boot.jsURLblock
hxxps://eil786npt…ifile.htmlURLblock
2f69879f1c5bdfe9c…83237d3ba6SHA256block
0xC4026b06D82b0F0…fbDc17884eEthereum/Polygon addressalert
19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyW…PnjsWrc3kWOtheralert
ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg…3qfacgred5Otheralert
THvs6p56XkUiMkJeS…4u2RsTYqxaOtheralert
FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE…v2fU2LrV5nOtheralert
UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5…wALTA5e09pOtheralert
qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9…f566hhpe58Otheralert
DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4…tU6efdMnu5Otheralert
window._k7Otheralert
window.__k7bOtheralert
data-channel-code="02111110"Otheralert
136[.]113[.]106[.]136IPv4alert
0:2033556a4994222…002d30397bOtheralert

Sources blog.report-uri.com · BleepingComputer · StepSecurity · infostealers.com · amirulcyber.com · The Hacker News · URLhaus · URLhaus (2) · URLhaus (3)

More detail
Note Optimizely's CDN served the injected customer Project JavaScript; the rest of each snippet and the cdn.optimizely.com host should not be treated as attacker infrastructure. 136[.]113[.]106[.]136, the Google Cloud address behind 1688360[.]cc, is alert only because cloud addresses are reassigned; other shared Google Cloud addresses tied to the .icu hosts are omitted. Report URI says its list of 178 organisations is likely incomplete because it only checked snippets it could find. Cleanup was largely complete by late 16 November, but a visit earlier that day may still have exposed card, cookie or wallet data, or older iOS devices to the exploit kits.

What to do

  1. Search proxy, DNS, firewall and EDR logs for 16 November 2026 connections to 1688360[.]cc (especially /track.js, /card.php and /hit.php) and to the published .icu, webshell[.]lol and linkforge[.]cc hosts; treat a hit as a lead that a browser ran the kit.
  2. If your site loads an Optimizely Web snippet, fetch it and search for 1688360, atob, window._k7 and data-channel-code 02111110, and review Project JavaScript and account access in the Optimizely dashboard.
  3. Anyone who entered a payment card on an affected site on 16 November should watch statements and contact their issuer if they see unrecognised charges; anyone who made a cryptocurrency transfer that day should check the destination address was not swapped.
  4. iPhone and iPad users who visited an affected site should install the latest iOS or iPadOS update. Rotate session cookies for sensitive accounts that were used in the same browser that day.

Behaviours to hunt 2

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert A browser or host connecting to 1688360[.]cc

    Look forA browser or host connecting to 1688360[.]cc, especially /track.js, /card.php or /hit.php, or to the campaign's .icu iOS-stage hosts

    Why it mattersScott Helme and BleepingComputer show that compromised Optimizely Project JavaScript loaded hxxps://1688360[.]cc/track.js, which skims payment cards to /card.php, beacons to /hit.php, and on iOS devices loads a second stage from a set of .icu hosts. A connection to those hosts from a workstation or a user's browser is a lead that the page ran the injected kit. blog.report-uri.com

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceNetworkEvents; proxy, DNS and firewall logs

    QueriesKQL

  2. hunt A page setting window._k7 or window.__k7b

    Look forA page setting window._k7 or window.__k7b, or loading a script tag with data-channel-code 02111110

    Why it mattersReport URI documents these JavaScript globals and the data-channel-code=02111110 attribute as markers left by the track.js payload and its iOS loader. They are useful for confirming a page ran the kit after a visit to an affected site on 16 November 2026. Expected false positives: very rare; these marker names are specific to this payload. blog.report-uri.com

    Log sourceWeb proxy or page-integrity tooling; browser developer tools on a suspected page

    QueriesNone yet: check by hand

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
B, S, L, R, G, Worldwide
Sectors
Media, Technology, Retail, Travel, Finance

Background

On 16 November 2026, attackers abused a vulnerability in Optimizely's Experimentation account signup flow to write malicious Project JavaScript into customer projects. The company's CDN then served the altered snippets, still from cdn.optimizely.com, to visitors of 178 organisations. Scott Helme found 188 infected files; BleepingComputer confirmed the payload on sites including the BBC, CNN, Fox News, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, Air France-KLM, IKEA and HSBC. The injected loader fetched hxxps://1688360[.]cc/track.js (some copies hid the URL in base64 or carried an inline fallback), which swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed payment cards to /card.php, collected cookies and screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads delivered the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits from a set of .icu hosts. Helme and BleepingComputer published attacker-owned domains, track.js hashes and clipper wallets; StepSecurity independently documented payload revisions and the same wallets. Optimizely told BleepingComputer it had blocked the vulnerable path, removed the injected code, ended sessions, revoked tokens and notified affected customers. Hudson Rock later recovered poisoned Optimizely and minute-ly files and, with additional evidence from Kirk at Ohey, showed the same kit also being served from Kissmetrics and StorifyMe scripts, which loaded webshell[.]lol/get.js. cdn.optimizely.com is a legitimate CDN; alert only. The attacker-owned domains, payload URLs and track.js hashes are on the block list; clipper wallets and JavaScript markers are alert and hunt. Optimizely's incident notice (01:02 UTC, 17 November) says an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation; it told Gizmodo the flaw was in the account signup flow. Report URI lists all 178 organisations: 32 in banking and finance (HSBC in 11 markets, Equifax, ABN AMRO), 23 in technology (Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, Optimizely's own www and login pages), 20 in retail (IKEA, ASOS, Mattel), streaming (Peacock, NOW TV), news (BBC, CNN, Fox News), airlines (Air France-KLM, Transavia), telecoms (Virgin Media O2, TalkTalk) and crypto and trading (Ledger, IG, OANDA / Coinpass, Interactive Investor). The first injection hit the BBC's snippet at 04:21 UTC on 16 November; Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned and then re-infected with a base64-hidden loader, and TalkTalk's was the last still infected at 21:52 UTC. The attacker's wallets received about $7,040 (StepSecurity counts about $6,600), and the ETH, BTC and LTC addresses were swept between 04:11 and 05:39 UTC on 17 November. Researcher Amirul Iman, who named the campaign OPTIMJACK, published the boot.js and exploit-page URLs and a boot.js hash. The address 1688360[.]cc resolved to, 136[.]113[.]106[.]136, is a Google Cloud address and is alert only; other Google Cloud addresses tied to the .icu hosts are not listed.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK6

Open in the live dashboard Get the blocklist