ScreenConnect CVE-2026-84869
Attackers Spray MSP ScreenConnect Servers to Exploit CVE-2026-84869 and Plant Rogue Clients on Technician Workstations
- Published
- 16 November 2026
- Added
- 17 November 2026, 08:05 UK
- Last updated
- 17 November 2026
34 to block now4 to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Huntress reported on 16 November 2026 the first confirmed in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9), a fl... The payload domain, its address, the rogue client hash and the attacker guest addresses are on the block list.
Do now
- Block the 34 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Patch CVE-2026-84869 now.
Indicators 38
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
masterdarky[.]com | Domain | block | |
hxxps://masterdar…Update.msi | URL | block | |
f8871b1561d5c77c2…13ef972841 | SHA256 | block | |
194[.]15[.]36[.]33 | IPv4 | block | |
91[.]224[.]92[.]167 | IPv4 | block | |
91[.]224[.]92[.]83 | IPv4 | block | |
193[.]26[.]115[.]63 | IPv4 | block | |
107[.]148[.]223[.]37 | IPv4 | block | |
162[.]35[.]40[.]249 | IPv4 | block | |
64[.]20[.]44[.]120 | IPv4 | block | |
103[.]195[.]102[.]66 | IPv4 | block | |
103[.]195[.]102[.]76 | IPv4 | block | |
199[.]127[.]60[.]150 | IPv4 | block | |
199[.]127[.]62[.]58 | IPv4 | block | |
181[.]215[.]242[.]106 | IPv4 | block | |
162[.]35[.]167[.]105 | IPv4 | block | |
23[.]92[.]65[.]131 | IPv4 | block | |
23[.]94[.]77[.]110 | IPv4 | block | |
198[.]23[.]165[.]181 | IPv4 | block | |
107[.]173[.]186[.]58 | IPv4 | block | |
50[.]114[.]203[.]14 | IPv4 | block | |
38[.]18[.]228[.]165 | IPv4 | block | |
66[.]118[.]239[.]23 | IPv4 | block | |
172[.]81[.]61[.]149 | IPv4 | block | |
178[.]173[.]246[.]85 | IPv4 | block | |
154[.]30[.]4[.]248 | IPv4 | block | |
107[.]148[.]223[.]103 | IPv4 | block | |
103[.]195[.]100[.]70 | IPv4 | block | |
103[.]195[.]100[.]69 | IPv4 | block | |
38[.]18[.]229[.]249 | IPv4 | block | |
98[.]142[.]247[.]243 | IPv4 | block | |
45[.]13[.]233[.]32 | IPv4 | block | |
38[.]18[.]228[.]173 | IPv4 | block | |
199[.]127[.]60[.]149 | IPv4 | block | |
57[.]128[.]131[.]66 | IPv4 | alert | |
74[.]235[.]98[.]176 | IPv4 | alert | |
update_224ac089.bat | File name | alert | |
WindowsUpdate.Win…Client.exe | File name | alert |
More detail
What to do
- Update every technician's ScreenConnect host client and every Access agent to 26.6.5 or later; until then remove the TransferFiles permission from roles and session groups.
- Block masterdarky[.]com, 194[.]15[.]36[.]33 and the rogue client hash, and search proxy, DNS, firewall and EDR logs from 20 October 2026 for them and for outbound TCP 8041.
- In the ScreenConnect session database, look for guest-originated RanFiles or SentFiles events for update.bat, update_<8hex>.bat, marker.txt, Run-Lateral.bat, svc_payload.cmd or Sync.bat, and delete blank-named guest sessions that keep requesting them.
- On technician workstations, hunt for ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe starting .bat, .cmd, .ps1, .vbs, .js or .txt files from Documents\*\Temp, for %LOCALAPPDATA%\wclient_<8hex> folders, %TEMP%\wupdate_<8hex>.msi files and unexpected Startup scripts.
- If a workstation was hit, isolate it, remove the rogue client, revoke sessions and rotate every MSP and customer credential it could reach.
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Not stated
- Sectors
- Not stated
Background
Huntress reported on 16 November 2026 the first confirmed in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9), a flaw in the ConnectWise ScreenConnect host client that lets a guest in a Support or Access session make a technician's client run a pushed file without any prompt. Since 20 October, attacker guest sessions on at least 42 MSP ScreenConnect servers, many labelled 'crypto client', sent about 688,000 'run file' requests for update.bat or update_<8hex>.bat from 29 IP addresses, waiting for a technician to join. On 12 November a technician on an unpatched client joined one: within about nine seconds update_224ac089.bat relaunched itself hidden, reported the new victim to a Telegram bot, downloaded WindowsUpdate.msi from masterdarky[.]com with curl, unpacked it to %LOCALAPPDATA%\wclient_224ac089 with msiexec /a and started WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe, a rebranded ScreenConnect client connected to the attacker's relay on port 8041. On 13 November another technician's client opened an attacker canary file, and in October guests tried to drop Sync.bat into technicians' Startup folders by path traversal. The payload domain, its address, the rogue client hash and the attacker guest addresses are on the block list.
Downloads
MITRE ATT&CK11
- T1199Trusted Relationship
- T1203Exploitation for Client Execution
- T1059.003Windows Command Shell
- T1564.003Hidden Window
- T1218.007Msiexec
- T1036.005Match Legitimate Name or Location
- T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1102.003One-Way Communication
- T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1219.002Remote Desktop Software
- T1571Non-Standard Port