Exploitation / remote access softwareCriticalTLP:CLEAR

ScreenConnect CVE-2026-84869

Attackers Spray MSP ScreenConnect Servers to Exploit CVE-2026-84869 and Plant Rogue Clients on Technician Workstations

Published
16 November 2026
Added
17 November 2026, 08:05 UK
Last updated
17 November 2026

34 to block now4 to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

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Summary

Huntress reported on 16 November 2026 the first confirmed in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9), a fl... The payload domain, its address, the rogue client hash and the attacker guest addresses are on the block list.

Do now

  1. Block the 34 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Patch CVE-2026-84869 now.

Indicators 38

ValueTypeActionCopy
masterdarky[.]comDomainblock
hxxps://masterdar…Update.msiURLblock
f8871b1561d5c77c2…13ef972841SHA256block
194[.]15[.]36[.]33IPv4block
91[.]224[.]92[.]167IPv4block
91[.]224[.]92[.]83IPv4block
193[.]26[.]115[.]63IPv4block
107[.]148[.]223[.]37IPv4block
162[.]35[.]40[.]249IPv4block
64[.]20[.]44[.]120IPv4block
103[.]195[.]102[.]66IPv4block
103[.]195[.]102[.]76IPv4block
199[.]127[.]60[.]150IPv4block
199[.]127[.]62[.]58IPv4block
181[.]215[.]242[.]106IPv4block
162[.]35[.]167[.]105IPv4block
23[.]92[.]65[.]131IPv4block
23[.]94[.]77[.]110IPv4block
198[.]23[.]165[.]181IPv4block
107[.]173[.]186[.]58IPv4block
50[.]114[.]203[.]14IPv4block
38[.]18[.]228[.]165IPv4block
66[.]118[.]239[.]23IPv4block
172[.]81[.]61[.]149IPv4block
178[.]173[.]246[.]85IPv4block
154[.]30[.]4[.]248IPv4block
107[.]148[.]223[.]103IPv4block
103[.]195[.]100[.]70IPv4block
103[.]195[.]100[.]69IPv4block
38[.]18[.]229[.]249IPv4block
98[.]142[.]247[.]243IPv4block
45[.]13[.]233[.]32IPv4block
38[.]18[.]228[.]173IPv4block
199[.]127[.]60[.]149IPv4block
57[.]128[.]131[.]66IPv4alert
74[.]235[.]98[.]176IPv4alert
update_224ac089.batFile namealert
WindowsUpdate.Win…Client.exeFile namealert

Sources Huntress · GBHackers

More detail
Note Huntress is the single source for the indicators; GBHackers and Cyberhawk repeat them. The fix is on the technician side: host clients and Access agents must be 26.6.5 or later, and updating the server alone does not help. 74[.]235[.]98[.]176 (Microsoft Azure) and 57[.]128[.]131[.]66 (OVH) are shared cloud and alert only. This is separate from the SCKit extension campaign and the crypto-exchange-named guest sessions already on the site, although those sessions may be lures for the same flaw.

What to do

  1. Update every technician's ScreenConnect host client and every Access agent to 26.6.5 or later; until then remove the TransferFiles permission from roles and session groups.
  2. Block masterdarky[.]com, 194[.]15[.]36[.]33 and the rogue client hash, and search proxy, DNS, firewall and EDR logs from 20 October 2026 for them and for outbound TCP 8041.
  3. In the ScreenConnect session database, look for guest-originated RanFiles or SentFiles events for update.bat, update_<8hex>.bat, marker.txt, Run-Lateral.bat, svc_payload.cmd or Sync.bat, and delete blank-named guest sessions that keep requesting them.
  4. On technician workstations, hunt for ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe starting .bat, .cmd, .ps1, .vbs, .js or .txt files from Documents\*\Temp, for %LOCALAPPDATA%\wclient_<8hex> folders, %TEMP%\wupdate_<8hex>.msi files and unexpected Startup scripts.
  5. If a workstation was hit, isolate it, remove the rogue client, revoke sessions and rotate every MSP and customer credential it could reach.

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Not stated
Sectors
Not stated

Background

Huntress reported on 16 November 2026 the first confirmed in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9), a flaw in the ConnectWise ScreenConnect host client that lets a guest in a Support or Access session make a technician's client run a pushed file without any prompt. Since 20 October, attacker guest sessions on at least 42 MSP ScreenConnect servers, many labelled 'crypto client', sent about 688,000 'run file' requests for update.bat or update_<8hex>.bat from 29 IP addresses, waiting for a technician to join. On 12 November a technician on an unpatched client joined one: within about nine seconds update_224ac089.bat relaunched itself hidden, reported the new victim to a Telegram bot, downloaded WindowsUpdate.msi from masterdarky[.]com with curl, unpacked it to %LOCALAPPDATA%\wclient_224ac089 with msiexec /a and started WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe, a rebranded ScreenConnect client connected to the attacker's relay on port 8041. On 13 November another technician's client opened an attacker canary file, and in October guests tried to drop Sync.bat into technicians' Startup folders by path traversal. The payload domain, its address, the rogue client hash and the attacker guest addresses are on the block list.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK11

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