ScreenConnect panel hijack
ScreenConnect Cloud Panel Hijack: Rogue Clients Pushed to MSP-Managed Endpoints
- Published
- 11 November 2026
- Added
- 11 November 2026, 22:05 UK
- Last updated
- 13 November 2026
12 to block now45 to hunt12 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Hijacked cloud ScreenConnect panels push rogue clients to MSP-managed endpoints and pivot back to technicians. The Hacker News reported the same CVE attribution on 12 November.
Do now
- Block the 12 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Patch technician-side Host and endpoint-side Guest clients now.
Indicators 57
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
185[.]99[.]255[.]28 | IPv4 | block | |
155[.]94[.]150[.]39 | IPv4 | block | |
newnewnew[.]gotdns[.]org | Domain | block | |
soxnewwork[.]homedns[.]org | Domain | block | |
sc[.]payproofkit[.]com | Domain | block | |
cdn007-digitaldow…oads[.]com | Domain | block | |
hxxps://ns[.]mo7s…dF.php?p=4 | URL | block | |
hxxps://ns[.]mo7s…dF.php?p=5 | URL | block | |
ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev | Domain | block | |
hxxps://ns[.]mo7s…v/EadF.php | URL | block | |
185[.]241[.]211[.]197 | IPv4 | block | |
007[.]from-ak[.]com | Domain | block | |
Panel-Lateral.ps1 | File name | alert | |
Run-Lateral-Full.bat | File name | alert | |
runnew.cmd | File name | alert | |
ToolboxRelayUploader.exe | File name | alert | |
2588ef5c15954b10 | Other | alert | |
ed630cc2c873b091 | Other | alert | |
d905b2b1b165d0a9 | Other | alert | |
4b8f4089ddaac6a9 | Other | alert | |
df1f7ef0cfacd0d8 | Other | alert | |
TrapWatch | Other | alert | |
C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\ | File name | alert | |
C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi | File name | alert | |
amexsafekeyupdate[.]com | Domain | alert | |
60142ea5daebbf94a…a3136ef4bb | SHA256 | alert | |
SSA-2026-STATEMEN…518787.bat | File name | alert | |
94b93c649b0ae0281…646355eb11 | SHA256 | alert | |
7a9aca9fdd4dcc13f…c1c80271ec | SHA256 | alert | |
b93f10f30ee453d1e…e0f4953b4d | SHA256 | alert | |
3c7a98f0fdb6235b8…07d7972ec4 | SHA256 | alert | |
d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7…611698de9a | SHA256 | alert | |
4a1dd3cd2ea14368a…9b810af04b | SHA256 | alert | |
8cb5f48bbe70b5248…7fd92e06af | SHA256 | alert | |
cf50d73fa8117a758…64efe93956 | SHA256 | alert | |
81cc2baa35b798d60…e97d19f781 | SHA256 | alert | |
c31e6f075cd77e018…5e297410a9 | SHA256 | alert | |
deda7c30d798a19b6…b2d2b9fb45 | SHA256 | alert | |
0bd84c776dc01f784…869724bf08 | SHA256 | alert | |
454c43d296b1276bd…45bce12a8a | SHA256 | alert | |
5dd3a6ba806ac4726…8d950148d0 | SHA256 | alert | |
43b7a5e56f9e6c7b7…1059e2db95 | SHA256 | alert | |
50659748723e906c8…d0c31fed61 | SHA256 | alert | |
a1937467fd862916f…fdba77dcdc | SHA256 | alert | |
338e37f58043635eb…34e55e88ec | SHA256 | alert | |
8e6912deed82e80bb…9a97cff4f4 | SHA256 | alert | |
d85315bd7602b6f5c…dd536ceb21 | SHA256 | alert | |
C:\Windows\Temp\s…it-run.bat | File name | alert | |
sckit-decoder.ps1 | File name | alert | |
SilentForceInstal…nstall.ps1 | File name | alert | |
Stop-LabTrap.ps1 | File name | alert | |
LabConfig.ps1 | File name | alert | |
Stage0Loader.ps1 | File name | alert | |
61a672a13f03a9e81…2d4e185ae2 | SHA256 | alert | |
0be01e7bd69cfdd22…961372fef2 | SHA1 | alert | |
3f81c9c874a896c46…aa3d9f2054 | SHA1 | alert | |
13ce33b19daee3963…c38f6bc0d3 | SHA1 | alert |
Sources Reddit r/msp · ConnectWise · Sophos · Huntress · Microsoft · BleepingComputer · Huntress (2) · Blackpoint Cyber · The Hacker News
More detail
What to do
- Check that the Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link extensions are disabled (on-premises partners must do this themselves), keep their installation records and logs, and do not re-enable them until ConnectWise says it is safe.
- Do not triage suspected hosts through ScreenConnect: use your EDR live-response shell, WinRM or another out-of-band tool, because an interactive session can carry the infection back to the technician's workstation.
- Revoke all active ScreenConnect web sessions, rotate ScreenConnect credentials, verify MFA in your identity provider, and audit Run Command and Toolbox history for mass executions you did not start.
- Block 185[.]99[.]255[.]28, ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev and the EadF.php stager URLs now (Huntress, Sophos and Blackpoint all saw them), also block 155[.]94[.]150[.]39, newnewnew[.]gotdns[.]org, soxnewwork[.]homedns[.]org, sc[.]payproofkit[.]com and cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com, block only these exact dynamic-DNS hostnames, not gotdns.org or homedns.org, and alert on amexsafekeyupdate[.]com.
- On endpoints, remove the rogue ScreenConnect client service (client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091), the TrapWatch scheduled task, C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\, %TEMP%\sckit-* and the RelayTrapLiteAlert Run value before lifting isolation.
- On technician workstations, look for sqlite3.exe or PowerShell reading browser cookie stores or .ASPXAUTH, for Panel-Lateral.ps1, LabConfig.ps1, Run-Lateral-Full.bat or %TEMP%\sckit-decoder.ps1, and for the toolkit hashes Huntress and Blackpoint published (a miss does not clear a host, because they change per host), then reset browser-stored sessions and tokens.
- Patch technician-side Host and endpoint-side Guest clients to ScreenConnect 26.6.5.9742 or later (CVE-2026-84869). The patch blocks RelayTrap's Guest-to-Host execution but does not protect a hijacked technician session; if a technician connected to a suspected host, revoke ScreenConnect web sessions from a clean device and rotate credentials.
Behaviours to hunt 12
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert Second ScreenConnect client pushed by Run Command
Look forScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi installed by an existing ScreenConnect client (Run Command pushing a second client), especially with c=Exploited in the installer query
Why it mattersWith panel access the actor uses Run Command to push a second, rogue ScreenConnect client to every managed endpoint; Huntress lists the installer pattern /Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?...&c=Exploited and the actor name Addmin. Legitimate MSP upgrades also run this installer, so judge the relay host and whether a change was scheduled. Reddit r/msp
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents; ScreenConnect audit log (Run Command and Toolbox history)
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert Rogue ScreenConnect client IDs or attacker relay
Look forScreenConnect client service whose command line carries the rogue client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 or ed630cc2c873b091, or a relay (h=) of 185[.]99[.]255[.]28 or the campaign C2 hostnames
Why it mattersEvery ScreenConnect client names its relay in the h= value of the service command line. Huntress published two rogue client IDs and the attacker relay, so a client pointing there is the backdoor itself. Reddit r/msp
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert TrapWatch scheduled task persistence
Look forTrapWatch scheduled task running as SYSTEM every 10 seconds
Why it mattersHuntress names the TrapWatch task as the persistence that reinfects endpoints within minutes of isolation being lifted. Reddit r/msp
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceEvents (ScheduledTaskCreated) and DeviceProcessEvents
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert RelayTrap and sckit staging files
Look forFiles under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\ or %TEMP%\sckit-*
Why it mattersHuntress lists both locations as campaign artefacts that must be wiped before an endpoint is released. Reddit r/msp
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert RelayTrapLiteAlert Run-key persistence
Look forRelayTrapLiteAlert value in a registry Run key
Why it mattersHuntress names this Run-key value as part of the persistence to remove. Reddit r/msp
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceRegistryEvents
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
hunt sqlite3 after ScreenConnect activity (reverse pivot)
Look forsqlite3.exe run on a device within 60 minutes of a ScreenConnect process on the same device (technician reverse pivot)
Why it mattersWhen a technician opens an interactive ScreenConnect session to an infected endpoint, the malware rides the session back, drops sqlite3.exe to scrape saved browser sessions and tokens, then pivots into other panels. Huntress does not give a time window; 60 minutes is a starting point to tune. Developer and database tools can run sqlite3.exe, so exclude known users and paths. Reddit r/msp
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents (join on DeviceId within 60 minutes)
QueriesKQL · SPL
hunt Unexpected mass Run Command or Toolbox use
Look forMass Run Command or Toolbox executions in the ScreenConnect audit log that no technician started
Why it mattersHuntress asks every ScreenConnect user to check Run Command history now, even with no alert, because the actor pushes the rogue client to all endpoints at once. Reddit r/msp
Log sourceScreenConnect audit and session logs
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
alert Guest-to-Host file transfer and Run within seconds of connect
Look forA ScreenConnect Host client receiving a file transfer and a Run from a Guest within seconds of a session starting, often Run-Lateral-Full.bat about 2.5 seconds after connect
Why it mattersBlackpoint found that RelayTrap replaces the legitimate Guest and, after a 2.5-second delay, tries a Guest-to-Host file transfer and execute (CVE-2026-84869) toward the connecting technician, typically sending Run-Lateral-Full.bat, which then pulls a loader from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php. A patched Host (26.6.5.9742 or later) blocks the exploit; Blackpoint and Huntress have not observed a successful Guest-to-Host. The trap still attempts the transfer against a patched Host. Blackpoint Cyber
Log sourceScreenConnect audit log (event ID 201 in session context); Defender XDR DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents on technician workstations
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
alert Non-browser or PowerShell access to .ASPXAUTH or cookie stores
Look for.ASPXAUTH cookie access by a non-browser process, or PowerShell reading browser cookie stores (Cookies, Login Data, Web Data) on a technician workstation
Why it mattersIf RelayTrap lands on the technician's Host, Panel-Lateral.ps1 and LabConfig.ps1 search local browser data and process memory for ScreenConnect .ASPXAUTH cookies and replay them against the panel. Blackpoint has not confirmed a successful cookie recovery or panel fan-out. Blackpoint Cyber
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents and DeviceFileEvents on technician workstations
QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L
hunt ScreenConnect panel session replayed from a new IP or user agent
Look forA ScreenConnect panel session replayed from a new IP address or user agent
Why it mattersAfter stealing an .ASPXAUTH cookie, SCKit is written to reuse the technician's already authenticated management session to push commands to other endpoints. A session that continues from a new IP or user agent, without a corresponding interactive login, is the fan-out signal. No successful technician pivot has been observed. Blackpoint Cyber
Log sourceScreenConnect audit and session logs; identity-provider sign-in logs for the panel
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
hunt Unpatched ScreenConnect clients (CVE-2026-84869)
Look forScreenConnect Host or Guest clients older than 26.6.5.9742 (CVE-2026-84869). The patch blocks RelayTrap's Guest-to-Host execution but does not protect a hijacked technician session
Why it mattersBlackpoint confirmed that RelayTrap targets CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9) and that a current patched Host does not request or execute the payload. Clients must be on 26.6.5.9742 or later, and Host clients may need a reinstall. Patching does not revoke a stolen .ASPXAUTH session. Blackpoint Cyber
Log sourceScreenConnect inventory, package and agent version reports
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
alert netsh interface portproxy rule that redirects 127[.]0[.]0[.]1:88 to a public IP
Look fornetsh interface portproxy rule that redirects 127[.]0[.]0[.]1:88 to a public IP, or a rogue UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe running from a C:\ProgramData\Windows Update Agent (...) folder
Why it mattersIn the 13 Nov 2026 SCKit wave Huntress saw a batch script in the ScreenConnect client folder launch msiexec to install UpdateConnect.ClientSetup.msi (c=ExploitedNOTUSA), a netsh portproxy from 127[.]0[.]0[.]1:88 to 185[.]241[.]211[.]197:80, a hosts-file change, and a LocalSystem service named Windows Update Agent running UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe. The legitimate ScreenConnect client is never named UpdateConnect and Windows has no service binary under that folder, so the file-name and folder match is sharp; the portproxy clause is limited to loopback listen addresses with a non-private connect address, and IIS/WSL or developer port forwards that point at internal hosts are excluded. Expected false positives: admin port forwards from loopback to a public jump host. Huntress
Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents
QueriesKQL
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Not stated
- Sectors
- Managed service providers (MSPs), MSP-managed customer organisations
Background
Huntress's SOC is responding to an active campaign that began around 17:47 UTC on 11 November 2026 against managed service providers using cloud-hosted ConnectWise ScreenConnect. At the time of its update Huntress was tracking six compromised MSPs and more than 286 endpoints, with the numbers rising; the actor numbers each victim MSP and the observed tags start partway through the sequence, so other MSPs were probably hit first. Huntress has seen no evidence of a new vulnerability and has not confirmed how the panels were accessed; the evidence points to stolen credentials or hijacked operator sessions. With panel access, the actor uses Run Command to push a second, rogue ScreenConnect client to every managed endpoint, giving an independent backdoor that no longer needs the MSP's panel. If a technician then opens an interactive ScreenConnect session to investigate, the malware rides that session back onto the technician's workstation, drops sqlite3.exe to scrape saved browser sessions and tokens, and pivots into any other ScreenConnect panels the technician can reach. Persistence is a TrapWatch scheduled task running as SYSTEM every 10 seconds, files under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\ and %TEMP%\sckit-*, and a RelayTrapLiteAlert Run-key value; endpoints reinfect within minutes if isolation is lifted before these are removed. ConnectWise confirmed the campaign in a Trust Center advisory at 22:45 UTC on 11 November, said the actor appears to deploy the extra remote-access software through third-party extensions, and disabled five of them (Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link) in about 400 partner environments; on-premises partners must disable them themselves. Sophos X-Ops independently observed the same activity: in one case curl.exe downloaded ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi from 185[.]99[.]255[.]28 to C:\Windows\TEMP\sc.msi, msiexec.exe installed it silently, and PowerShell with execution-policy bypass fetched the second stage from the ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev stager. Sophos saw the commands come from three ScreenConnect instance IDs that are likely compromised MSP instances (d905b2b1b165d0a9, 4b8f4089ddaac6a9 and df1f7ef0cfacd0d8) and install the same two rogue client IDs Huntress reported. Huntress's customer advisory, updated at 00:29 UTC on 12 November, adds that the toolkit installs a modified client that impersonates the MSP's own client and waits for a technician to connect. Because Huntress, Sophos and now Blackpoint saw them independently, the attacker relay 185[.]99[.]255[.]28, the ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev stager and its EadF.php URLs are high confidence and on the block-now list, and the two rogue client IDs are high-confidence hunting leads; the secondary C2 server, the dynamic-DNS and payproofkit hostnames and cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com are also listed by Blackpoint and are on the block list at high confidence. BleepingComputer found a July 2026 SSA-themed batch file on VirusTotal that installs ScreenConnect from cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com, contacts amexsafekeyupdate[.]com and checks for rogue client ID ed630cc2c873b091; whether that earlier activity belongs to this campaign is not confirmed, so its domain, hash and file name are alert-only. Huntress's full SCKit write-up, published on its blog late on 11 November, puts the count at 288 endpoints in 48 organisations within 90 minutes, says the current ScreenConnect releases 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783 are affected, and breaks down the 16-file toolkit: the dropper writes C:\Windows\Temp\sckit-run.bat, fetches a host-keyed kit whose decryption key comes back in the server's response headers, and a later stage pulls sqlite3.exe from EadF.php?p=5 to read browser cookie databases. Huntress found that the worm's attempt to take over technician consoles failed in every host log it recovered, but it still advises against triaging over ScreenConnect. It also published 16 toolkit hashes; because the scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each machine, these are alert-only hunting leads, and the p=5 URL and cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com (now listed by Huntress as C2 and recovered again by Blackpoint) are on the block list. Blackpoint Cyber's Adversary Pursuit Group, writing on 11 November, recovered the same toolkit from the ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev staging endpoint and showed that RelayTrap.cs exploits CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9), a Guest-to-Host file transfer and execute flaw fixed in ScreenConnect 26.6.5.9742 and later. In a controlled test a current patched Host never requested or executed the payload, and Blackpoint's SOC has not seen successful Guest-to-Host propagation; the trap still tries the transfer about 2.5 seconds after a technician session starts, sending Run-Lateral-Full.bat toward the Host and then pulling a loader from EadF.php. Follow-on scripts (Panel-Lateral.ps1 and LabConfig.ps1) try to recover the technician's .ASPXAUTH cookie from browser data and memory and replay it against the panel; the patch does not stop that session hijack, and no successful technician pivot has been observed. Because Blackpoint independently recovered the same relay, staging host, Access installer sources, dynamic-DNS hostnames and rogue client IDs, those indicators stay on the block list at high confidence. The Hacker News reported the same CVE attribution on 12 November. Microsoft Threat Intelligence's analysis on 13 November confirms the same relay, panel, staging and dynamic-DNS infrastructure, the two rogue client IDs and the toolkit hashes, and adds the sc.msi installer hash and SHA1 values, which are alert-only hunting leads. Huntress's 13 November update reports a second wave from 16:12 UTC hitting 205 more hosts in 41 organisations, installing a rogue UpdateConnect client from 185[.]241[.]211[.]197 (1337 Services bulletproof hosting, inside a Spamhaus DROP range) that relays to 007[.]from-ak[.]com on port 88 behind a netsh portproxy and a Windows Update Agent service; both are on the block list at high confidence.