APT / espionageCriticalTLP:CLEAR

TGR-STA-0049 HTTP/3 RATs

TGR-STA-0049 Targets Southeast Asian Governments With PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT RATs Using HTTP/3 C2

Published
16 November 2026
Added
17 November 2026, 05:14 UK
Last updated
17 November 2026

74 to block now7 to hunt

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  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
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Summary

China-linked espionage cluster runs new PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT RATs over HTTP/3 C2 against Southeast Asian governments. Both talk HTTP/3 over QUIC (UDP 443) with HTTP/2 fallback.

Do now

  1. Block the 74 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Block the eight C2 host names and the published hashes, and….

Indicators 81

ValueTypeActionCopy
2281e754f70e11298…2ab873dc6eSHA256block
9721d65ee7695db2b…7fe95aeb0dSHA256block
d725ad8b523c94f99…25d410c365SHA256block
f4c9d5d13c1a09533…bde82b0457SHA256block
19bb3012d846f3672…6564c7d0b8SHA256block
92fb9545ea49e2fb4…fc8bc80b67SHA256block
ab06f540ecdd1d454…f1e1b69588SHA256block
bf59f8d7ef79b09a7…67117ca008SHA256block
8bf9401990d3255d1…e5f0d637a2SHA256block
5f857ff78bfbef2a5…ce9615ddeeSHA256block
61f7e2f4159c56657…11df922120SHA256block
5b7effbf0465c05e8…e5b7af8344SHA256block
cd8f43da328495847…8612e757d2SHA256block
7541222a1316ec54b…e7cb1bde4bSHA256block
cffcd6f2589d3ab4f…e179c3f311SHA256block
5805cb5b0a6fb738e…41c5e0ef17SHA256block
a6a9ccffadd00b0e7…49a48c8e10SHA256block
b975f5932c04b381f…bb3393718bSHA256block
904409ce8846394e1…74759af2bbSHA256block
d700b573ea8387efa…e7b62f3b67SHA256block
52d3442fb26023ebc…0511527f07SHA256block
8cfe629fc08ae06c8…031e0ebe70SHA256block
619b749e1c6634d38…8bc34fdfcbSHA256block
fb5b0b1d083d6f6af…7818756563SHA256block
183abf82951c2052e…0988caeaa0SHA256block
0533365accbba4057…b8a41ed97bSHA256block
3cb5376a5e6c0fcbd…be33964fa1SHA256block
f5ebe85418655d75d…2febc038d7SHA256block
b5bea4d8b94fbb39a…61cf7b9a88SHA256block
7745523939fc6b31b…fcd14b65f4SHA256block
0c49e1b98a236d339…6bce58e6e7SHA256block
24c46bc9269e1c1ee…27f678af86SHA256block
e5689e1bf916c2f76…a8296377a1SHA256block
63eac14921f138fff…697d2942d0SHA256block
790e6699704395a7f…9eefbd7ff2SHA256block
f82c06184ab36e91d…8f12423684SHA256block
2e52b2936e67872d1…d6e2c04aa4SHA256block
9dfefc7118646535d…6f45903aadSHA256block
600572a912650b258…acfdc67b7fSHA256block
86194c3b3cc7a58e4…f1cf5a7191SHA256block
e8cd6bbcf6073669a…95f0c99889SHA256block
5b779b81a9bb25591…346ab8d772SHA256block
c4b4647795567ab15…1973e87c02SHA256block
bf8afbd1c2074c7cd…c4edde7697SHA256block
b8dca1c7e7a74ce82…ac59bfd0e4SHA256block
9fb0976fcd1f92c47…5327f8f490SHA256block
7225ef57161cf0908…00784c0688SHA256block
a214d264c6bb0d2ba…fbef4cc140SHA256block
662dc73e11b60b2f1…0629d0705dSHA256block
b062b4d8c19baf5c1…5c1bdbf887SHA256block
34cc9bc4a533b91e7…47b3b37b78SHA256block
0cbde9b7f59dafca8…783e6b097fSHA256block
cdc9757294d3063eb…6b02eeefbfSHA256block
99f571c07170250a8…33ea3d438fSHA256block
7ee22a7b028102bb2…28bd472a4fSHA256block
571067cc8f4224a4b…84a24efa27SHA256block
8d8ccf24b785a33a9…57ef73087cSHA256block
0e01c44e5a0615098…15a93f540aSHA256block
1dd423ff0106b15fd…f6681a0850SHA256block
04be7621750027533…e83e315589SHA256block
3deb43cc864f2322d…f1c0c5fdb6SHA256block
224ed1d3f8d724798…9bef46a723SHA256block
9b16333820189e94b…834f5cd11dSHA256block
bdcd0eefc62721814…ec7ce93823SHA256block
3e56d049f23ed45a7…120439c7ccSHA256block
834491282da22555f…1caf19f854SHA256block
www[.]maui-cocktailbar[.]comDomainblock
ads-edge[.]comDomainblock
www[.]wkuyda[.]comDomainblock
www[.]thailisting[.]netDomainblock
www[.]yangon[.]it[.]comDomainblock
www[.]cloudflacecdn[.]comDomainblock
www[.]police[.]gr[.]comDomainblock
www[.]investigationj6[.]comDomainblock
82a989c728db4e09a…70bf09a8a5SHA256alert
71d897427329ca14d…5391a56afeSHA256alert
6781f84417d0056df…8d49de3490SHA256alert
dd02d28c48cf5cabd…9e54968c78SHA256alert
e59b08eb03ffa10cc…29ef92d8fdSHA256alert
27[.]254[.]164[.]212IPv4alert
27[.]254[.]164[.]209IPv4alert

Sources Unit 42

More detail
Note Unit 42 is the single source and names no victim countries beyond Southeast Asia. 27[.]254[.]164[.]209 and 27[.]254[.]164[.]212 sit in a Thai web-hosting range and are alert only. Five files Unit 42 lists as unmapped are alert only. The two SharpDPAPI hashes match the actor's builds of a public tool, so other copies of SharpDPAPI will not match. Block the C2 host names exactly; it.com and gr.com are shared second-level registries.

What to do

  1. Block the eight C2 host names and the published hashes, and search DNS, proxy, firewall and EDR logs back to July 2025 for the host names and for 27[.]254[.]164[.]209 and 27[.]254[.]164[.]212.
  2. Patch and review internet-facing Exchange and IIS servers for ASPXSpy, Godzilla or Suo5 web shells, and check every mailbox for FullAccess grants added in bulk with Add-MailboxPermission and for ApplicationImpersonation role queries.
  3. Hunt for rundll32.exe loading comsvcs.dll by ordinal (for example #+000024 or MiniDump) against lsass, a new service named PsExec with the pipe \\.\pipe\PSEXEC, the pipe WINDOW_SEC_WATCHDOG, files under C:\ProgramData\Cyvera\, and changes to domain logon scripts.
  4. Log or inspect outbound QUIC (UDP 443) from servers, or block it so traffic falls back to TCP where TLS inspection works; servers rarely need QUIC.

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Southeast Asia
Sectors
Government

Background

Unit 42 reported on 16 November 2026 an espionage campaign against Southeast Asian government entities, active since at least July 2025, by the cluster it tracks as TGR-STA-0049 (also reported as REF7707, Earth Alux and Ink Dragon, previously linked to the Squidoor/FINALDRAFT backdoor). The actor mainly gets in by exploiting unpatched Microsoft Exchange and web servers and planting web shells such as ASPXSpy, Godzilla and Suo5, and also sends phishing executables with PDF icons from lookalike government domains, one with a decoy about Myanmar's 2025 election. Two previously undocumented families follow: the Go-based PerfectPioneer RAT, run from web shells, decoy installers (one dropped a real GlobalProtect installer as cover) or a modified legitimate executable that side-loads a loader DLL to decrypt XOR shellcode, and its modular successor KUKURAT, seen from March 2026, which loads modules from the C2, generates fake network, registry and temp-file activity to bury its own, and pairs with a watchdog over the named pipe WINDOW_SEC_WATCHDOG (once placed in C:\ProgramData\Cyvera\Ransomware\). Both talk HTTP/3 over QUIC (UDP 443) with HTTP/2 fallback. The actor spread through domain logon scripts, PsExec (including a custom PsExecService that creates a service named PsExec and the pipe \\.\pipe\PSEXEC), WMI and WinRM, dumped LSASS with rundll32 and comsvcs.dll by ordinal, ran DCSync and SharpDPAPI, and granted itself FullAccess on every Exchange mailbox before exfiltrating documents. The published C2 domains and malware, web shell and tool hashes are on the block list.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK14

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