Teams device-code phishing
Microsoft Teams Booking-Flow Device-Code Phishing
- Published
- 12 November 2026
- Added
- 12 November 2026, 22:55 UK
- Last updated
- 12 November 2026
2 to block now2 to hunt2 behaviours to hunt
Hunt3 platforms
Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.
- Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
- SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
- Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral
These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.
Summary
Device-code phishing hidden inside a fake Microsoft Teams meeting-booking flow, with backend on gpimmlgration[.]com. Completing that step authorised a Cmsi:Cmsi Microsoft Authentication Broker session, which the attacker then replayed through a residential proxy.
Do now
- Block the 2 indicators.
- Run the hunt.
- Check for the listed behaviours.
Indicators 4
| Value | Type | Action | Copy |
|---|---|---|---|
gpimmlgration[.]com | Domain | block | |
hxxps://gpimmlgra…tic-export | URL | block | |
hxxps://share[.]g…VWI5V9GJM1 | URL | alert | |
Cmsi:Cmsi | Other | alert |
Sources Huntress
More detail
What to do
- Block gpimmlgration[.]com and hxxps://gpimmlgration[.]com/static-export, and search email, proxy and DNS logs for them and for the short-link query UltJkMsVWI5V9GJM1.
- Hunt Entra ID sign-in logs for unexpected Cmsi:Cmsi or device-code authentications after a meeting-booking lure, for programmatic user agents such as python-requests or node, and for a mid-session change of ASN or region.
- Restrict or monitor device-code authentication where it is not required, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and after a confirmed hit check for rogue MFA methods, unrecognised devices, app consents, mailbox rules and unusual outbound mail.
- Train staff that a meeting-booking page which asks them to copy or enter a Microsoft code should be verified out of band before they approve it.
Behaviours to hunt 2
Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.
alert An unexpected Microsoft device-code or Cmsi:Cmsi Authentication Broker...
Look forAn unexpected Microsoft device-code or Cmsi:Cmsi Authentication Broker sign-in that follows a Teams meeting-booking page, a Confirm Meeting control that copies a code to the clipboard, or a link through share[.]google/?q=UltJkMsVWI5V9GJM1
Why it mattersHuntress saw a typo-squatted executive lure that walked the target through a fake Microsoft Teams Meeting Scheduler, silently started a device-code request, copied the user code when they confirmed the meeting, then opened Microsoft's real device-login page. Completing that step hands the attacker the session. Huntress
Log sourceEntra ID / Microsoft 365 sign-in logs, email safe-link and URL logs, endpoint clipboard or browser events
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
alert Device-code or Cmsi:Cmsi sign-ins from programmatic user agents such as...
Look forDevice-code or Cmsi:Cmsi sign-ins from programmatic user agents such as python-requests or node, or a mid-session change of ASN or region consistent with a residential proxy
Why it mattersHuntress saw the captured session replayed through a residential callback proxy so it looked like ordinary consumer traffic, and noted programmatic user agents in the sign-in logs. The kit also restarts the device-code flow when Microsoft returns AADSTS50076 or interaction_required. Huntress
Log sourceEntra ID interactive and non-interactive sign-in logs
QueriesNone yet: check by hand
Affected countries and sectors
- Targets
- Not stated
- Sectors
- Construction
Background
Huntress reports a mid-October device-code phishing incident against a construction-sector company that hid the Microsoft device-code flow inside a convincing Microsoft Teams meeting-booking page. The spear-phishing email impersonated a real senior vice president at another construction firm, using a typo-squatted domain that Huntress has redacted, and a Microsoft Safe Links-wrapped Google short link to reach a lure that looked like a Teams Meeting Scheduler. Behind the scenes the page started a device-code sign-in; when the target clicked Confirm Meeting the user code was copied to the clipboard and Microsoft's real device-login page opened. Completing that step authorised a Cmsi:Cmsi Microsoft Authentication Broker session, which the attacker then replayed through a residential proxy. The phishing kit was delivered as AES-256-GCM ciphertext and talked to gpimmlgration[.]com/static-export. That domain and URL are on the block list. Do not block Microsoft or Google; the specific short-link query is alert only.