Supply chain / developer toolsHighTLP:CLEAR

Claude Code extension backdoor

Trojanized Claude Code IDE Extension Plants Persistent Reverse SSH Backdoor on Developer Machines

Published
30 October 2026
Added
14 November 2026, 10:17 UK
Last updated
14 November 2026

6 to block now2 to hunt3 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Tampered Claude Code editor extension served for 11 hours adds an attacker SSH key and a persistent reverse SSH tunnel on developer machines. The six file hashes are on the block list; the C2 address is alert and hunt.

Do now

  1. Block the 6 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Check for com.apple.sysmond.plist.

Indicators 8

ValueTypeActionCopy
ecb58cb29078d9646…cc3ab6bf15SHA256block
7e0a52885fadee055…3decb0e278SHA256block
fcbb327e38e61c4fe…3c3a17c364SHA256block
3de17229011657698…9966edd081SHA256block
80402fdcad8799285…8e4f84ee6cSHA256block
6786ec90cbd459496…cb9cb21731SHA256block
134[.]209[.]82[.]225IPv4alert
hxxp://134[.]209[…099/beaconURLalert

Sources Cursor · Cursor (2) · Microsoft · Netskope Threat Labs · ThreatFox · MalwareBazaar

More detail
Note 134[.]209[.]82[.]225 is DigitalOcean cloud hosting and was reported taken down, so it is alert and hunt rather than block; use it to find past victims in 30-90 days of network logs. Removing or updating the extension does not remove the SSH key, scripts or startup entries. ifconfig.me and api.ipify.org lookups are legitimate services the loader also calls and are not indicators on their own.

What to do

  1. Find every machine that installed or auto-updated anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from the Cursor marketplace between 09:27 and 20:35 UTC on 29 October 2026, and search 90 days of firewall, proxy and EDR network logs for 134[.]209[.]82[.]225 (TCP 22 and 8099).
  2. On those machines check ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (Windows: %USERPROFILE%\.ssh\authorized_keys and C:\ProgramData\ssh\administrators_authorized_keys) for a key with the comment svc-telemetry and fingerprint SHA256:0Z6R+DF64Do2nwQic8a7kkfDLNNk4IiK+2U2Rci4htk, and remove only that entry after collecting evidence.
  3. Remove the persistence: ~/.config/.smt, ~/.config/.smtk and ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.sysmond.plist on macOS, the @reboot crontab line on Linux, and the SysMon scheduled task, Startup\sysmon.cmd, %USERPROFILE%\.config\smt.cmd and smtk on Windows; kill ssh or autossh processes running -N -R *:0:localhost:22 and delete $TMPDIR/.stk_* files.
  4. Rotate every credential reachable from an affected machine (git, SSH, cloud, API keys and tokens held in environment variables) from a clean device, and review SSH logons to the machine since 29 October.
  5. Restrict editor extensions to approved publishers and set an installation cooldown for newly published versions.

Behaviours to hunt 3

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert ssh reverse tunnel to local port 22

    Look forssh or autossh opening a reverse forward from a server-assigned remote port to the local SSH port (-R *:0:localhost:22)

    Why it mattersMicrosoft and Netskope show the loader launching ssh (autossh -M 0 on macOS and Linux, a hidden PowerShell retry loop on Windows) with -N -R '*:0:localhost:22', host-key checks disabled and a key file from $TMPDIR/.stk_* or ~/.config/.smtk, so the attacker can reach the workstation's own SSH service through their server. Asking the remote server to allocate any port (0) and forward it back to local port 22 is not how developers or remote-support tools normally use SSH. Expected false positives are rare admin-built reverse tunnels for remote access, which usually use a fixed remote port; review the destination and parent process. Microsoft

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceProcessEvents (Windows and macOS); EDR process events; Linux auditd

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  2. alert SysMon, sysmond or .smt persistence files

    Look forLoader persistence files .smt, .smtk, smt.cmd, smtk, $TMPDIR/.stk_*, com.apple.sysmond.plist or Startup\sysmon.cmd, or a SysMon scheduled task that runs smt

    Why it mattersMicrosoft and Netskope list these exact names: ~/.config/.smt and .smtk (macOS, Linux), %USERPROFILE%\.config\smt.cmd and smtk plus a SysMon scheduled task or a Startup-folder sysmon.cmd (Windows), ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.sysmond.plist (macOS) and a temporary .stk_ followed by ten hex characters key file. The names imitate monitoring tools but none belongs to Sysinternals Sysmon (which installs as a service, not a Startup batch file or a user LaunchAgent) or to Apple. Matching sysmon.cmd only in the Startup folder and the task only when it references smt keeps false positives close to none. Netskope Threat Labs

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents and DeviceEvents (ScheduledTaskCreated); EDR file events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  3. hunt Editor process writing authorized_keys

    Look forauthorized_keys or administrators_authorized_keys written by the code editor or its Node.js extension host

    Why it mattersThe loader runs inside the editor's extension host and appends an Ed25519 key with the comment svc-telemetry to the user's authorized_keys (and administrators_authorized_keys on Windows where present), per Microsoft. Editors do not normally write SSH authorisation files on the local machine; remote-development extensions do this on the remote host, not the workstation. Expected false positives are developers deliberately editing authorized_keys in the editor, so confirm the svc-telemetry comment or fingerprint SHA256:0Z6R+DF64Do2nwQic8a7kkfDLNNk4IiK+2U2Rci4htk. Microsoft

    Log sourceDefender XDR DeviceFileEvents; file integrity monitoring on SSH key files

    QueriesKQL

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Worldwide
Sectors
Software development

Background

On 29 October 2026 an attacker used a credential stolen in a vendor-side key exposure to place tampered copies of the anthropic.claude-code extension (versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, macOS arm64 and Windows x64) on the cache that serves the Cursor editor's extension marketplace. The builds were live for about 11 hours (09:27-20:35 UTC) and up to 5,000 users may have received them; Anthropic did not publish them and the VS Code Marketplace, npm and Open VSX copies were clean. A loader prepended to extension.js runs when the editor starts, collects the hostname, user, OS, git email, public IP and the names of secret-looking environment variables, adds an attacker SSH key marked svc-telemetry to authorized_keys, tries to enable SSH, opens a persistent reverse SSH tunnel to 134[.]209[.]82[.]225 as user tunnel, installs persistence (SysMon scheduled task or Startup sysmon.cmd on Windows, com.apple.sysmond LaunchAgent on macOS, @reboot cron on Linux) and posts host details to port 8099. The six file hashes are on the block list; the C2 address is alert and hunt.

Downloads

View folder in repository

MITRE ATT&CK10

Open in the live dashboard Get the blocklist