Exploitation / hypervisor managementHighTLP:CLEAR

Xen Orchestra auth bypass

Xen Orchestra Authentication Bypass (VSA-2026-062) Exploited to Take Over XCP-ng Hosts

Published
10 November 2026
Added
11 November 2026, 10:05 UK
Last updated
11 November 2026

2 to block now15 to hunt4 behaviours to hunt

Hunt3 platforms

Run the hunt before you block, to find past activity. The same hunt is published for each platform. Preview and copy the queries in the dashboard.

  • Defender XDRKQLDefender portal > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Paste and run over 30 days.Download hunt.kql
  • SplunkSPLSearch & Reporting, last 30 days or more. Reads the CIM data models.Download hunt.spl
  • Google SecOpsYARA-L 2.0Rules Editor. Paste, Retrohunt over 30 days, then turn on live mode.Download hunt.yaral

These queries can return false positives. Know your environment and confirm a hit before acting.

Summary

Cookie-based auth bypass in the Xen Orchestra console exploited to take over XCP-ng hosts as root. Vates reports active exploitation of VSA-2026-062, a critical authentication bypass in Xen Orchestra, the web console that manages XCP-ng virtualisation pools.

Do now

  1. Block the 2 indicators.
  2. Run the hunt.
  3. Update Xen Orchestra now.

Indicators 17

ValueTypeActionCopy
91[.]211[.]251[.]112IPv4block
193[.]148[.]56[.]72IPv4block
37[.]221[.]208[.]216IPv4alert
45[.]66[.]35[.]11IPv4alert
64[.]65[.]0[.]120IPv4alert
64[.]65[.]62[.]160IPv4alert
89[.]47[.]51[.]90IPv4alert
92[.]60[.]37[.]247IPv4alert
ustar3rqxgnskzgnw…id[.]onionOtheralert
authenticationToken=j:{}Otheralert
authenticationToken=j:%7B%7DOtheralert
pivot2Otheralert
/etc/cron.d/zz-ustarFile namealert
/etc/cron.d/zz-ustar2File namealert
/.ustar5File namealert
/.ustar6File namealert
hvm_serial: fileOthermonitor

Sources Vates · The Hacker News

More detail

What to do

  1. Update Xen Orchestra to 6.9.2 (stable) or 6.10.1 (latest), or xo-server to 5.211.2 or 5.213.1, and keep the console on a dedicated management network that is not reachable from the internet.
  2. Block 91[.]211[.]251[.]112 and 193[.]148[.]56[.]72 in both directions, block Tor from management networks, and search 30 days of firewall and proxy logs for these addresses and the six Tor relays.
  3. Add a WAF or reverse-proxy rule for authenticationToken=j:{} and authenticationToken=j:%7B%7D, and search proxy and web server logs for both patterns, because Xen Orchestra does not log the bypass.
  4. On every XCP-ng host, look for a VM named pivot2, VMs with hvm_serial: file, '-serial file:' in /var/log/xensource.log*, and /etc/cron.d/zz-ustar*, /.ustar5, /.ustar6 and /etc/ld.so.preload. If compromised, reinstall and rotate every Vates VMS secret, including backup remotes, the pool secret, root and user passwords, OTP secrets and mail settings.

Behaviours to hunt 4

Behaviours are leads, not confirmed indicators, and can match legitimate activity. Compare any hit against your own baseline and environment before acting.

  1. alert Auth-bypass cookie sent to Xen Orchestra

    Look forHTTP requests to Xen Orchestra with the cookie authenticationToken=j:{} or authenticationToken=j:%7B%7D

    Why it mattersThis is the bypass itself, and Xen Orchestra does not log it. Other encodings can evade a naive regex. Vates

    Log sourceReverse-proxy, WAF or packet capture in front of Xen Orchestra

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  2. hunt Login-token harvesting requests

    Look forRequests to /rest/v0/users/me/authentication_tokens from unfamiliar addresses

    Why it mattersAfter the bypass this route returns reusable login tokens. Vates

    Log sourceReverse-proxy and web logs

    QueriesKQL · SPL

  3. alert Attacker foothold VM on XCP-ng

    Look forA VM named pivot2, VMs with hvm_serial: file, or '-serial file:' in /var/log/xensource.log

    Why it mattersVates lists these as signs of the attacker's foothold VM on compromised pools. Vates

    Log sourceXCP-ng hosts (xe vm-list, xensource.log), syslog

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

  4. alert Persistence files on XCP-ng hosts

    Look forFiles /etc/cron.d/zz-ustar, /etc/cron.d/zz-ustar2, /.ustar5, /.ustar6, or a new /etc/ld.so.preload

    Why it mattersPersistence files planted by this actor on XCP-ng hosts. Vates

    Log sourceXCP-ng host file checks, EDR file events

    QueriesKQL · SPL · YARA-L

Affected countries and sectors

Targets
Not stated
Sectors
Not stated

Background

Vates reports active exploitation of VSA-2026-062, a critical authentication bypass in Xen Orchestra, the web console that manages XCP-ng virtualisation pools. A request carrying the cookie authenticationToken=j:{} (or its URL-encoded form, j:%7B%7D) makes Xen Orchestra treat the value as an empty object, return the first stored token and log the sender in as that token's owner, usually an administrator; the /rest/v0/users/me/authentication_tokens route then hands back reusable login tokens. From there an attacker can run code on managed pools and take over XCP-ng hosts as root. The threat actor operated initially from 91[.]211[.]251[.]112:8001 and a Tor onion service on port 3333, ran a VM named pivot2, configured VMs with a file-backed serial port and planted /etc/cron.d/zz-ustar, /etc/cron.d/zz-ustar2, /.ustar5 and /.ustar6 on hosts. Xen Orchestra does not log the bypass. Six of the eight addresses Vates lists for blocking are public Tor relays, including a Tor directory authority, so they are marked alert rather than block. The flaw has no CVE yet; it is fixed in Xen Orchestra 6.9.2 (stable) and 6.10.1 (latest), and was discovered by TDC NET Security.

Downloads

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MITRE ATT&CK6

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